BtcTurk, SuperRare, and WETC: $52M Lost to Access Control Failures
From leaked keys to inverted require() to broken whitelist logic—these three exploits show that access control isn’t a checklist, it’s your protocol’s trust boundary. If it fails, everything else is noise.
In Brief
BtcTurk lost $51.7M across seven chains after a private key leak.
SuperRare lost $680K due to an inverted access check in updateMerkleRoot() function.
WETC Token lost $100K due to a whitelist bug in _transfer() function.
Hacks Analysis
BtcTurk | Amount Lost: $51.7M
On August 14th, the BtcTurk exploit on multiple chains resulted in a $51.7M loss due to a private key leak. The attacker was able to drain hot-wallets for more than 90 assets across Ethereum, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, Optimism, Mantle, and Polygon. BtcTurk acknowledged the incident and paused all deposits and withdrawals. It was their second private key compromise in 14 months.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
Exploited Contract (one of the hot wallets): 0xde2faca4bbc0aca08ff04d387c39b6f6325bf82a
On July 28th, the SuperRare exploit on the Ethereum mainnet resulted in a $680K loss due to an access control vulnerability. The root cause was in the updateMerkleRoot() function in the RareStakingV1 contract where the access check was inverted. It prevented the owner from updating the Merkle root but allowed any external account to do so. The attacker called this function to install a malicious Merkle root under their control. With that root in place, drained 11,907,875 RARE tokens.
On July 17th, the WETC Token exploit on the BNB Chain resulted in a $100K loss. The root cause of the exploit was in the private _transfer() function where if either ‘from’ or ‘to’ address is whitelisted, the code calls super._transfer and does not return. It then continues into the DEX path and runs transferBuy/transferSell, moving tokens a second time. The attacker sent WETC to the pair to create balance over reserves, then called skim to send that excess to a whitelisted address. The bug doubled each skim payout and allowed the attacker to make a profit.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
Exploited Contract (on BSC): 0xe7f12b72bfd6e83c237318b89512b418e7f6d7a7
The rich text element allows you to create and format headings, paragraphs, blockquotes, images, and video all in one place instead of having to add and format them individually. Just double-click and easily create content.
A rich text element can be used with static or dynamic content. For static content, just drop it into any page and begin editing. For dynamic content, add a rich text field to any collection and then connect a rich text element to that field in the settings panel. Voila!
Headings, paragraphs, blockquotes, figures, images, and figure captions can all be styled after a class is added to the rich text element using the "When inside of" nested selector system.
Follow-up: Conduct a follow-up review to ensure that the remediation steps were effective and that the smart contract is now secure.
Follow-up: Conduct a follow-up review to ensure that the remediation steps were effective and that the smart contract is now secure.
In Brief
Remitano suffered a $2.7M loss due to a private key compromise.
GAMBL’s recommendation system was exploited.
DAppSocial lost $530K due to a logic vulnerability.
Rocketswap’s private keys were inadvertently deployed on the server.
Hacks
Hacks Analysis
Huobi | Amount Lost: $8M
On September 24th, the Huobi Global exploit on the Ethereum Mainnet resulted in a $8 million loss due to the compromise of private keys. The attacker executed the attack in a single transaction by sending 4,999 ETH to a malicious contract. The attacker then created a second malicious contract and transferred 1,001 ETH to this new contract. Huobi has since confirmed that they have identified the attacker and has extended an offer of a 5% white hat bounty reward if the funds are returned to the exchange.
.webp)
